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TAX COMPETITION BASED ON THE CROSS-BORDER PURCHASE BY CONSUMERS IN A STACKELBERG GAME

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dc.contributor.author Sung-Kyu Lee
dc.date.accessioned 2013-06-18T08:19:35Z
dc.date.available 2013-06-18T08:19:35Z
dc.date.issued 2013-06-18
dc.identifier.issn 978-601-80217-1-8
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.enu.kz/handle/data/10390
dc.description http://www.enu.kz/ ru_RU
dc.description.abstract With cross-border shopping in mind, consumers try to take advantage of tax differentials and each government which maximizes tax revenue on the basis of the Leviathan model may attempt to induce cross-border shoppers into its own country by lowering its own tax rate than the competitors. ru_RU
dc.relation.ispartofseries УДК;330
dc.subject Cross-border shopping ru_RU
dc.subject Tax competition ru_RU
dc.subject Nash equilibrium ru_RU
dc.subject Stackelberg equilibrium ru_RU
dc.title TAX COMPETITION BASED ON THE CROSS-BORDER PURCHASE BY CONSUMERS IN A STACKELBERG GAME ru_RU
dc.type Article ru_RU


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