

FOREIGN POLICY DOCTRINE OF EUROPEAN UNION

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The European Union is a political actor, unique in its own way. Sovereignty, as well as the incentive motive for foreign policy action, is shared between member states and various institutional players. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify what we mean by discussing the foreign policy of the European Union. On the one hand, each of the member states has its own foreign policy priorities. On the other hand, the European Union itself speaks with one voice when communicating with third countries at multilateral summits. The principles on which this collective voice rests is defined in the Lisbon Treaty - these are principles of democracy, the rule of law, universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law. There is no other international organization in the world in which so many players would interact at different levels of government as in the EU, as a result of which the process of making foreign policy decisions in the EU is very complex.

In the end, it communicates with the outside world in three different ways:

- (1) Intergovernmental,
- (2) Through supranational institutions,
- (3) Through individual member states. [1, p 131]

Meanwhile, the term “foreign policy” is traditionally used to describe how states build their relations with other states within the framework of the international system. In essence, this term reflects precisely the state-centric approach, even when it is used in relations between states and other actors, such as international organizations.

Since the European Union (EU) is not a state, it lacks centralized power and its own state institutions, while its foreign policy reflects, in particular, the general features of the functioning of its specific (supranational) institutions [2, P. 186]. Meanwhile, the European communities, from which the European Union grew, have actually become participants in international relations since their appearance in the 1950s. Over time, the term “external relations” has a quite definite meaning in its appendix to the EU, meaning foreign trade, assistance to third countries and a number of other isolated sector “low” spheres of its international activities, which the European Commission (the Commission, EC) engaged in and later began to oppose “High” dimension of its foreign policy.

The foundations of the European Union’s foreign policy has certain values, including the most important value of maintaining peace, as well as the basic values of human rights and dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, justice and solidarity. Of course, these values themselves are not unique to the EU or its foreign policy. It means that the European Union interprets them in a certain way, transforming such interpretations into basic principles that guideline for its foreign policy course. The latter, in turn, include, inter alia, the principles of conflict prevention, the principles of conditionality (to promote human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance), the principles of prevention for the purposes of environmental modernization, and multilateralism and commitment to free and regulated trade. Based on this, we can judge the European Union's foreign policy as fundamentally aimed at transforming the world in a certain direction, based on faith in human progress and in the significance of the legal paradigm. [3, p 519]

The European Security Strategy 2003 makes it possible to judge the basics of the EU foreign policy doctrine, namely:

1. The EU should take all necessary steps in response to numerous global security challenges and threats, including regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, state disability, organized crime, dangerous diseases and destructive poverty

(Progress Report on the ESS-2003, issued by in 2008, added to this list maritime piracy, threats to cyber security, energy security and climate change, and the Global Strategy 2016, as you SISO, also highlights the demographics, migration, hybrid threats and protection of external borders);

2. The EU should focus on building regional security in the “European Neighborhood” zone, which includes the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean region and the Middle East;

3. In the long term, the EU should pursue the goal of creating a rules-based, multilateral world order in which international law, peace and security are provided by strong regional and global institutions (in the 2008 Report mentioned above, it was stated that the goal of building effective multilateralism is EU with key third countries).

European Union’s Foreign Policy doctrine consists of three politics: European foreign policy action service, European neighborhood policy, multilateralism. These policies combine peace building – through political, economic and practical support, security, good relations with the EU's immediate neighbours, development and humanitarian aid and crisis response, tackling climate change and human rights issues.

Officially, *the European External Relations Service* began operations on January 1, 2011. The service is headed by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also the Vice-President of the European Commission and the Permanent Chairman of the EU Council in the format of foreign ministers (Council of Foreign Ministers), as well as the formal head of the European Defense Agency (ESA) (in practice, the direct administration is carried out by the Chief Administrator of the EAO).

The first High Representative for Foreign Affairs in the format defined by the Treaty of Lisbon, in November 2009, became the British Catherine Ashton (Catherine Ashton). She turned out to be a consensus figure, acceptable, first of all, for European socialists and social democrats. In 2014, Mogherini replaced Ashton as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs.

The duties of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy include the following:

- (1) maintaining the EU foreign policy;
- (2) coordination of the work of thematic instruments for the implementation of EU foreign policy;
- (3) participation in the development of a common course in the foreign policy of countries;
- (4) regular attendance at EU Heads of State and Government meetings at the European Council;
- (5) ensuring the consistency of external actions of the European Union, which are taken in different directions;
- (6) representation of the EU in matters relating to the common foreign and security policy, conducting political dialogue with third parties on behalf of the European Union, speaking about the position of the EU in international organizations and at international conferences;
- (7) the management of the EEAS and the delegations of the European Union in third countries and international organizations;
- (8) management of the European Defense Agency and the EU Institute for Security Studies.[3, p 44]

The European Neighborhood Policy has been in effect since May 2004. Its launch was associated with the process of massive EU expansion in the 2000s, accompanied by a serious change in its external borders, which created the problem of building the EU's relations with the countries of the new neighborhood. In the words of Karel De Gucht, at that time the Foreign Minister of Belgium, the European Union had already reached its limits in its ability to “assimilate new member states” and in the medium term, limit the further enlargement of the EU, but at the same time continue to spread outside the European values of democracy, respect for human rights and a market economy so that countries bordering on the EU do not create threats to it, capable of directly or indirectly disturb the peace in a united Europe (as a maximum), or place it in carrying out its own strategic goals and objectives (as a minimum). Note that the very name of this policy with the prefix “European” in the English version (European Neighborhood Policy) looks like a

deliberate attempt by the EU to assign the “brand” of belonging to Europe primarily to itself, which contradicts the concept of the Council of Europe, all of which, including not EU members are European countries. At the same time, the neighborhood policy does not include Russia (Russia at the time refused to join this initiative, preferring the bilateral format of relations with the EU). The EU neighborhood policy provides for an emphasis on conditionality that does not fit Russia.

The ENP was extended to 6 eastern (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) and 10 southern (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Autonomy, Syria, Tunisia) in its location relative to the European Union defined as its "neighbors". Not all of them border the EU geographically (by sea or by land) - for example, Jordan and Azerbaijan are not geographically direct neighbors of the EU. In general, apart from the geographical proximity of the listed countries to the EU, as well as problems with conflicts, stability and respect for human rights, in principle they have little in common. As of the end of 2016, the ENP instruments are only in 12 of the listed countries - negotiations with Algeria are not over yet, Belarus, Libya and Syria remain outside the scope of most of the ENP instruments.

The Neighborhood Policy uses the following basic tools:

1) The European Union (and its member states) enters into either a partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) or an association agreement (CA). In particular, in recent years, agreements on association and the creation of an in-depth and comprehensive free trade zone have been concluded with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, negotiations are underway on a new framework agreement with Armenia and the EU has authorized the start of negotiations on a new comprehensive agreement with Azerbaijan.

2) Since 2014, the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI), a total of EUR 15.4 billion for the period 2014–2020, has been a key instrument for the ENP. The EIS supports 4 types of programs: bilateral programs for the countries of the neighborhood, regional programs for the eastern and southern countries of the neighborhood, funding from the Erasmus for All program and programs for cross-border cooperation between the Member States and the countries of the neighborhood (16 programs are implemented across the border cooperation, 7 of which provide for the participation of Russia).

3) Strategic reports and action plans (association agenda for Eastern Partnership countries) are developed for each neighborhood country with short-term and medium-term priorities reflecting the needs and possibilities of the specific country and EU interests for a period of three to five years. Each year, the Commission, together with the High Representative, publishes a report on progress towards the goals set out in these documents.

4) Visa facilitation and readmission agreements or partnership agreements have become the standard foreign policy instrument within the European Neighborhood Policy. In matters of mobility. The relevant agreements have been concluded with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In 2014, the relevant negotiations were started with Belarus.

5) The macro-financial assistance tool is applied by the EU to countries that are experiencing a balance of payments crisis. Assistance is provided in the form of medium-term and long-term loans, loans, grants. This advanced tool was created specifically for countries that are close to the EU geographically, economically and / or politically. Apart from Ukraine, at various times Tunisia, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Jordan have already received or receive financial assistance from the EU. [4, p18]

The ENP is sometimes called a hybrid policy, arguing that it is difficult to attribute to any particular category. Judging by the toolbox, there is a clear similarity with the EU enlargement process. In conceptual terms, it can be interpreted as a form of externalization (transfer of action from the internal to the external plan). The application of the ENP was based on Brussels' confidence that if a country achieved entry into an open and integrated market of a European level, operating on the basis of compatible or harmonized rules, it approached the European Union to the maximum extent accessible to those states that are not full members, and in fact, will be able to enjoy the implied benefits of their new status, interpreted as EU membership without the right to vote. It was originally about the intention to transfer the values and norms of the European Union to

the countries of the neighborhood, implemented in the framework of the overall process of Europeanization.

The Treaty of Lisbon underlines the European Union's commitment to *multilateralism* in international relations. A key aspect of the EU's activities in this area is participation in international organizations, in building relations with which it seeks to take on a leadership role or at least set the tone for the work of these organizations. In fact, the integration formation faces serious obstacles, which does not allow for the implementation of clearly overestimated ambitions. Organizations with which the EU cooperates can be divided into international, regional and informal forums.

Today, the following options for EU participation in the work of international organizations can be highlighted:

1) Full voting membership is an exceptional situation for the EU. Thus, the EU is a full-fledged member of the WTO, since international trade is precisely the area in which it has both powerful resources and great institutional potential.

2) Observer status is close to full membership, or an advanced observer — an illustration in this case can be the relationship of the EU with the UN and the World Customs Organization (WCO). In the latter, the status of the EU is close to full membership, but formal acquisition requires all 172 WCO member states to adopt an appropriate amendment to its statute, which would allow economic and customs unions to join the Organization along with sovereign states. WCO member states in every way impede EU accession as a full participant. Therefore, an increase in status in international organizations is the result of the painstaking and long-term work of representatives of a united Europe. Although the rights of an advanced observer do not include participation in voting, depending on the specific organization, they can be provided with such opportunities as speaking in plenary session, participation in working groups, amending and so on. However, not all EU member states advocate the expansion of the powers of a European supranational formation in the international organizations of which they themselves are members.

3) Permanent Observer - this status of the EU has, for example, at the International Labor Organization (ILO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), etc. Moreover, EU countries are full members of these organizations, that is, parallel representation. In most cases, being a permanent observer, the European Union is trying in every way to upgrade its status to an advanced observer, but this is not always possible for him. An example of such a political struggle is the International Maritime Organization (IMO), in which the European Commission (not the Community before and not the Union now) has an observer status since 1974. In 2002, the Commission recommended the Council to seek full membership in IMO. But during discussions in the Council, the EC initiative came across resistance from the EU member states. Since then, the status of the Commission with IMO has remained unchanged. Thus, the expansion of EU powers in international organizations is opposed not only by third countries, but often by the Union states themselves.

4) The lack of official status is not uncommon for the EU in the practice of international cooperation. For example, despite the wide powers and the presence of supranational legislation in the field of transport, the EU was not even able to obtain observer status with such an influential transport organization as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Another example is the UN Security Council, in which the representation of the interests of the Union is carried out through its member countries, according to Art. 34 DES. Also, the EU has not yet managed to become an observer at the Arctic Council, despite the filing of the application three times. A particular case is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), where the EU does not have a formal observer status, but the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) has a corresponding status.[5, p 732]

We can conclude that the difficulty in choosing an accurate analytical framework for the explanation of EU foreign policy is due to the low suitability for this of traditional ideas about foreign policy. In order to better understand the meaning of the foreign policy actions of the European Union, it is not necessary to directly attach to it the categories that are used in the study of

state foreign policy. Such a view distorts the true state of affairs. It is more useful to ask whether the European Union, as a political system in which certain decisions are made and implemented, is capable of achieving its own goals in the international arena, in cooperation with other international players, using the arsenal of tools at its disposal. We give a positive answer to this general question, which, however, needs clarification.

In this paper, the specifics of the European Union's methods of implementing its policy in the international arena are revealed and the tools it uses are demonstrated. It can be argued that the forms of participation of the European Union in international affairs are very different from how they conduct their foreign policy of the state. Nevertheless, there is every reason to consider its international policy as a foreign policy, moreover, quite influential - let it be a question of a special kind of foreign policy. The European Union inevitably behaves in world affairs differently from states. There are plenty of arguments that convincingly dispute such claims. The essence of the specifics, its features are also not in the fact that the EU foreign policy is liberal in normative respect. The essence of the matter is that the external EU is implemented as a special management method, adopted and developed within the EU, which, as it were, overturns outward - into the international environment. It is more difficult for those who are not familiar with the internal governance of the EU to recognize its actions in the international arena as foreign policy.

The EU's global presence, on top of everything else, is provided by its trade power and connections. It is the world's largest market and an important (or key) destination for the export of many developing and developed countries. The EU's weakness as a foreign player is due primarily to the lack of institutional or other means that would help players acting within this system to achieve political agreement among themselves on specific foreign policy issues, developing unambiguous positions for which the EU could promptly throw out the impressive means available to him (potentially).

In the political system of the European Union, which is devoid of a consistent hierarchy, European institutions are not able to pursue a common strategic vision that would allow it to clearly prioritize its global policy. This is a system of foreign policy management in which we observe not only several mutually imposing and overlapping policies, each of which has its own organizational logic, but also an abundance of institutional actors (both EU institutions and its member states) located at different levels. In matters of "high" foreign policy, the competence of supranational institutions remains relatively weak, undeveloped.[6, p 416]

The central organizational problem of the foreign policy of the European Union is that national governments do not want to formally transfer power in foreign policy making to supranational institutions. As a result, the EU is limited in its ability to respond to international crises in real time. Therefore, for the EU, now armed interventions for the purpose of crisis settlement outside its territory are not actually on the top of the agenda, although individual member states (France) conduct such operations on their own. Thus, in the EU, foreign policy is carried out through numerous channels, not all of which are under the centralized control of a single executive branch. For many years, separate divisions of the Commission were responsible for maintaining various aspects of its external relations - in the field of international development, trade, fisheries, environmental protection - while the Council and later the European Council were involved in "high" political issues of international relations. In the absence of a central executive structure, the specific method of managing foreign policy worked simultaneously as complex and decentralized.

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