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«ҒЫЛЫМ ЖӘНЕ БІЛІМ – 2017»

студенттер мен жас ғалымдардың
XII Халықаралық ғылыми конференциясының
БАЯНДАМАЛАР ЖИНАҒЫ

СБОРНИК МАТЕРИАЛОВ

XII Международной научной конференции
студентов и молодых ученых
«НАУКА И ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ – 2017»

PROCEEDINGS

of the XII International Scientific Conference
for students and young scholars
«SCIENCE AND EDUCATION - 2017»



14th April 2017, Astana



**ҚАЗАҚСТАН РЕСПУБЛИКАСЫ БІЛІМ ЖӘНЕ ҒЫЛЫМ МИНИСТРЛІГІ
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In conclusion it should be noted that the bank of ecological terminology continues to expand as the modern development of science and technology accompanied by the emergence of harmful production and technology worsens the ecological situation throughout the world. In this regard, there is a need to study and describe both the factors that have a negative impact on the environment and the ways to deal with them and it does require a new terminology.

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RUSSIAN-POLISH RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR

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The feelings which Russia and Poland have towards each other are “always marked by mistrust”. [1] From historical point of view, Poles always were fighting with oppressive neighbors (tsarist Russia, and the USSR), which explains why Poles support Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine in fights against Russia, referring to the heritage of solidarity. [2] The Baltic States with the big Russian-speaking population and Poland had strong anti-Russian moods because of a possibility of revival of Russian imperial ambitions. [3] They claim that "there will be no independent Poland without independent Ukraine" and "Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire". [4] Since the collapse of the USSR, Polish relations towards Russia have been built on the basis of these claims, and Ukraine was an integral part of the process of development of bilateral relations.

On the way of joining the EU and NATO, Poland was trying to shape European policy towards Ukraine and Belarus. This was the place when Poland's plans contradicted to the interests of Russia. Russia and Poland for a long time had tensions regarding the territories of current Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, which were part of First and Second Polish republic. [5] After the collapse of the USSR, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine became independent, this was supposed to put an end to the tensions between Russia and Poland. [6] However, after the end of Cold War, these territories continued to play an important role both for Russia and Poland, which had different

ideologies and developing models for them. One of the goals of Polish foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR was the establishment of closer relations with Ukraine, strengthening the independence to create a counterweight to Russia in the post-Soviet space. According to Zagorski, newly created Belarus and Ukraine differently developed than Lithuania and Poland, which choose democratic regime and were striving to join NATO and the EU. Belarus choose the way of dictatorship with pro-Russian, and at the same time anti-Polish (anti-Western) ideology. While Ukraine held a double policy in the international arena, declaring a desire to strengthen ties with Russia and integration with Euro-Atlantic structures; there were certain democratic institutes, which gave the hope for Ukrainian democratic development.[7] Therefore, Poland was focused on helping Ukraine in developing western-orientation model by active participation in the events of “Orange Revolution” of 2004, the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, which faced with Russian resistance and led to the high level of mistrust between Poland and Russia.

Till 2004 Poland’s role of the factor stimulating pro-European orientation in foreign policy of Ukraine, and their promotion for the entry of Ukraine to the EU and NATO were not seriously perceived in Russia because at that time Poland itself was not a member of NATO (till 1999) and the EU.[8] Shortly after Poland’s accession to the EU in May of 2004, Ukrainian presidential elections, in which Poland was highly interested, took place. Mass protests against the pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich government and pro-Western orientation of the Ukrainian opposition led by Viktor Yushchenko, were perceived in Poland as a real chance for Ukraine's reorientation to the West.[9] This meant that there was a possibility to change Ukraine’s pro-Russian orientation, which was held by Leonid Kuchma’s government [10] (1994-2005) to pro-European direction.

During and after the “Orange revolution”, Poland competed with Russia for the influence in Ukraine by using tools of the EU.[11] This was demonstrated when Polish authorities with the EU representatives joined the events in Ukraine. As the former Polish president emphasized, the participation of the EU representatives was necessary in order the intermediary mission did not look like the Polish action.[12] On November 26, Alexander Kwasniewski, Valdas Adamkus and Javier Solana [13] have arrived to Kiev. Participation of Poland in permission of political crisis was expressed, first of all, in intermediary mission of the president Kwasniewski promoted negotiations, [14] which resulted in achievement of the decision on carrying out the third round of elections. After all, the requirement of repetition of the second round was made by the European parliament. [15] As a result of repeated elections, V. Yushchenko has received 51,99% of votes, and has been elected as a president of Ukraine.

As it was noted at the beginning of this paper, consolidation of independence of Ukraine and support of westernized tendencies were perceived by majority of Polish politicians, and the victory of the pro-European candidate corresponded to their interests. Hence, the victory of the Orange Revolution, perceived as the Ukrainians’ choice of the western model of development, has been recognized as a key event for Poland at the international level. However, Poland’s desire to stabilize Ukraine were commented negatively by Russian politicians, who suggested that the “Orange revolution” was initially excited by US and Poland, and it served to the foreign interests of Poland for hegemonic position in Ukraine. [16] In the interview to 'Tygodnik Powszechny', A. Kwasniewski has declared that there cannot be more wrong judgment, than the statements that “the Orange revolution is the Russian-Polish war for Ukraine”, claiming that he was one of the representatives of EU in Kiev [17] The main negative consequence of support of 'orange revolution' for Poland became cooling in the Polish-Russian relations.

The process of democratization of Ukraine did not work, because of growing authoritarianism, and rapprochement with Russia. In November 2013, Ukraine refused to sign the association agreement with the EU, which was implemented by the pressure of Putin to Yanukovich, who was later overthrown in the result of massive protests. [18] The failure of two anti-European campaigns of 2004 and 2014 did not discourage Russian political ambitions concerning Ukraine; Russia has invaded the Ukraine and annexed Crimea, which was perceived by Poland as “aggression against the brotherly Ukrainian nation.”[19] In this situation, Poland has called the EU to condemn an act of aggression and to develop effective measures against Russia.

[20] In 2014 the new authorities of Ukraine (Petro Poroshenko) signed the association agreement with the EU, which led to Russian aggression against Ukraine. After the annexation of Crimea, Poland was convincing the EU and IMF to support the new Ukrainian regime and securing the country's independency from Russia. At the end of July 2014, Poland with the assistance of Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and the Baltic States, succeeded to convince other EU Member States to start introducing the economic sanctions against Russia.[21]

It is necessary to emphasize that "The Maidan revolution" has caused quite radical changes in moods of the Polish government, especially the Prime Minister Donald Tusk (from 2014) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski, towards Russia. Mutual recriminations and the language characteristic to cold war have been told by Russian and Polish sides. [22] Moreover, such attitude was present among mass media. Thereby, after the event in Ukraine (2014) Russia and Poland using propaganda and disinformation tools started the "information war".[23] The majority of editions appeared with the shouting headings "Ukraine today - tomorrow Poland!" Accession of the Crimea has been explained with the strategic importance of the peninsula within the general strategy of attack to Kiev.

It is no wonder that the fear of the approaching war has captured the Polish society, which is expressed on the results of surveys. The surveys of 2012 noticeably differs from those of 2014: Poles negatively perceive Russia.[24] On survey of the Polish Center of Research of Public Opinion (CBOS) conducted at the beginning of August, it has become clear that Poles feel the greatest threat from Russia (considering the Ukrainian crisis), those were 78%.[25] At the same time 80% of respondents called Russia as the country potentially dangerous to Poland. On other survey conducted by CBOS on May, 65% of Poles called the relations of their country with Russia as bad, and only 3% good.[26] The main reason for negative opinions is connected with the Russian policy towards Ukraine, Nemtsov's murder and "low scale of protests against Vladimir Putin." [27] Here we can recall the statement made by Dmitry Medvedev about "a zone of exclusive interests", and his statement "to be prepared for an intervention abroad to protect the so called «compatriots»", which was negatively perceived by Poles.[28] According to Zagorski, "statements of this kind were believed to reflect intentions to define the development model and the foreign policy of respective countries using the very same methods that were used to justify the partitions of Poland in the 18th century and in 1939".[29] After all, under this pretext, Russia annexed Crimea, and by this poses a threat to Poland's sovereignty, because there will be no independent Poland without independent Ukraine.

One of the most important factors contributing to Polish-Russian mistrust is an issue of missile-defense bases. In 2005 the US government expressed the desire to place the missile-defense systems in Poland, which was supported by Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz in 2005, later Jarosław Kaczyński (2006-2007) and Donald Tusk (from 2007).[30] This idea was opposed by Russian authorities arguing that the realization of the US plans in Poland will negatively effect on the "strategic balance between Russia and the USA".[31] In Poland, the agreement was beneficial for reasons of strengthening the alliance with the United States and from the point of view of promotion of security in the region, in particular in terms of protection from Russia.[32] In 2008 Poland signed the agreement with the United States; however, the US administration under Barack Obama has refused to implement it.[33] The US administration recently changed their decision regarding this question due to several factors, including the Crimean annexation and military tensions on the EU-Russian borders. For example, during the last two years, the Baltic States repeatedly faced with Russian military exercises, which were more and more disturbing and aggressive.[34] At the same time Poland by referring to the article 4 of the North Atlantic contract evoked the attention of NATO claiming that their territorial integrity, political independence is under the threat.[35] As a result, NATO has increased the air presence in the region, and sent 600 troops to the Baltic States and Poland convincing them that the alliance does not violate with its obligations.[36] It has become known that on May 12 of 2016 the building of missile-defense system base in Poland has begun.[37] According to the US Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work, the measures to place missile-defense systems in Poland and Romania (started operating on May 12, 2016) were

implemented for securing NATO members from Iran's ballistic missiles.[38] The Western authorities claim that the placement of missile defense system in Poland and Romania are not the manifestation of aggression against Russia: "Missile defense is for defense. It does not undermine or weaken Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent" said NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.[39] Nevertheless, "Russia has described the U.S. anti-missile shield in Europe as a "threat" and says it is taking "protective measures" to guard against it." [40] Putin claims that by using mass media, representatives of NATO and the USA try to mislead all, saying that it does not threaten the safety of Russia. However, it is obvious that this decision is "a part of nuclear capacity of the USA taken out on the periphery. And in this case the periphery is the Eastern Europe... Now after placement of these missile defense elements, we will be forced to think of stopping the threats arising in respect of security of the Russian Federation." [41]

It is obvious that Poland for a very long time was waiting for NATO's presence in their territory to increase the security of the country from the imperialist ambitions of Russia. And even taking into consideration the official target of these missiles, Poland sees them, first of all, as safety umbrella from Russia than the threat from Iranian development of ballistic missiles.

According to Szeptycki, since the end of the Cold War, when both Poland and Ukraine gained their independencies, Poland acted and continues to act as "advocate" of Ukraine in the issues regarding the EU and NATO. And thus wants to become the leading country in Eastern policy of the EU, which will "strengthen positions of Poland on the international scene." [42] The Polish desire for strengthening the Ukrainian independence is crucial for security of Poland from Russian imperial ambitions. Polish efforts for democratization of Ukraine, and its membership in the EU and NATO was a goal of most of the Polish authorities for more than 20 years; even so, it was not fully successful. Nevertheless, thanks to the efforts of Warsaw in Ukraine appeared "pro-democratic elite and activists, who played essential role in pressing for democratic changes in 2014." [43]

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THE CONTINENT OF LOST LANGUAGES

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There are more than 7 thousand languages on the Earth.

With the development of communications reduced the number of living languages with an average rate of 1 to two weeks language.

On the 40 most common languages talking about 2/3 of the world's population. Most people speak Chinese, Hindi, English, Spanish, Arabic, Russian and Portuguese. Significantly widespread and French, but the number of those who consider it their native (first), is relatively small. There are currently just over 400 languages, which are considered endangered. Languages die with the last carrier, and therefore in danger, above all peoples who are not using the writing.

Native languages of North America - Native languages of indigenous inhabitants of the continent.

It is known about 296 Indian languages of North America, living and extinct. They are combined into 34 linguistic families and 27 isolated languages. Some of these families, such as Algonquian, Siouan-Dene and consist of a large number of individual languages; others restricted to a few, or just one language.

There are various attempts to classify the languages of North America, including the classification of John Powell, Edward Sapir and Joseph Greenberg. In particular, Greenberg believes that there are grounds to oppose the only three American families: Eskimo-Aleut, Na-Dene, and Amerind, including all the other languages of the Americas. Greenberg's concept is now rejected by most experts.

Despite the offers over the years a large number of hypotheses about the association of the families in a smaller number of groups, most of them rejected. More or less look promising only two hypotheses: penutiyskaya (№№ 21-31) and hokanskaya (№№ 32-41).

Below is a so-called "conservative classification" based on the works available by 1995. [Goddard 1996]. The curly brackets indicate the number of languages.

Actually North America