









Студенттер мен жас ғалымдардың **«ҒЫЛЫМ ЖӘНЕ БІЛІМ - 2018»** XIII Халықаралық ғылыми конференциясы

СБОРНИК МАТЕРИАЛОВ

XIII Международная научная конференция студентов и молодых ученых «НАУКА И ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ - 2018»

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The proceedings are the papers of students, undergraduates, doctoral students and young researchers on topical issues of natural and technical sciences and humanities.

В сборник вошли доклады студентов, магистрантов, докторантов и молодых ученых по актуальным вопросам естественно-технических и гуманитарных наук.

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THE ROLE OF THE CASPIAN SEA IN REGIONAL ENERGY SECURITY

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The Caspian Sea has always been important for the regional security and trade needs. It plays even more significant role in terms of energy security. The Caspian Sea presents a great opportunity not only for development and extraction of the existent energy deposits, but also provides a logistical solution for the oil and gas export from Central Asia and Caucasus to the European market. However, the inability to define the legal status of the Caspian Sea by the countries bordering it, makes it impossible to proceed further in the wanted direction. Therefore, the question of the Caspian Sea territory demarcation along with the establishing of cooperation on the sea among the littoral states should be regarded as of a great importance for Kazakhstan and aforementioned countries.

After the dissolution of the USSR, the question of the Caspian Sea legal status was not completely resolved. The reason for that was the conflict of political interests between the five states of the Caspian Sea region. One of the contradictions was whether to define the Caspian Sea as a sea or as a lake, depending on which the demarcation should be carried out either by the sea or lake regulations in the international law. As for the political interests, none of the countries wanted to compromise its pretentions on their share of rich biologic and energy resources. The cornerstone of the problem is actually an inability to choose the seabed delimitation approach. Generally, there have been two options that were brought up by the states. The first one is the delimitation along the

median line, which is supported by the three out of five Caspian littoral states, namely Kazakhstan, Russia, and Azerbaijan. In contrast, the second option is an approach of equal share, whereby each country acquires 20% of the Caspian seabed. This method is heavily advocated by both Iran and Turkmenistan. It is important to understand, that the choice between the two above-mentioned approaches is critical to the national interests of each country. Thus, the principle of the median line relies on the area of state's coastal junction to the sea. In this case, Kazakhstan, Russia and Azerbaijan have a visible advantage to Iran or Turkmenistan, which territory is prolonged into the continental area, while the coastal part constitutes only a minor part of the country. However, if the method of 20% was applied, Iran and Turkmenistan could acquire the same amount of the marine territory as the other three littoral states. Such scenario is surely unwelcomed by Kazakhstan, Russia or Azerbaijan. Taking into account the long history of the unresolved issue, potential loss of profit in case of further lacking consensus, and general majority outweighing the minority, the median line approach is the most likely option expected to be applied in the process of the Convention elaboration.

The Convention has been in the process of elaboration for already twenty years. The documents contains the basic principles of interaction of the parties on the Caspian Sea, questions of water area demarcation, definition of national seabed sectors, implementation of military, economic cooperation, environmental protection etc. The very first steps were undertaken during the end of the 1990s, when the republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation have concluded the Agreement on the delimitation of the northern part of the Caspian seabed in 1998, while the respective protocol was signed four years later. After conclusion of the agreement with the Russian Federation, the same was implemented towards the Republic of Azerbaijan in 2001 and in 2003 the protocol was brought in place. After the territorial issues had been settled between Kazakhstan and its neighbors, Russia and Azerbaijan themselves needed to regulate their Caspian border. They did this on the 14th May 2003 in the form of the Agreement on the Junction Point of the Delimitation Lines of the Adjacent Parts of the Caspian Seabed. As for Turkmenistan, it took some time until it signed the respective agreement with Kazakhstan in 2014. So far, the further work on the regulation of the Caspian question has been executed in the form of the Caspian Heads of States Summits as well as the foreign ministers' meetings. Up to today, there were four presidential summits, which took place in 2002, 2007, 2010, and 2014. As for the foreign ministers' meetings, they were organized in 1996, 2004, 2007, 2014, and 2016. The last bid for the question's resolution was undertaken by the countries in 2007 during the Tehran Summit; however, the parties were still not able to come to an agreement regarding final demarcation of the Caspian Sea area. Meanwhile, the ubiquity of the Caspian legal status impedes implementation of prospective joint projects in the energy sector among the countries.

The joint projects in the energy sector include various oil and gas transportation routes as well as the exploration and development stages within the upstream sector. One of the brightest examples among those is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC). The BTC project's construction began in the year 2003, and despite the involvement of numerous international companies, was mainly operated and designed by the British Petroleum (BP). The BTC is in operation since 2006. The pipeline was envisaged to transport the Azeri crude through the territory of Georgia to the port of Ceyhan in Turkey. The unique route designed for the pipeline makes it one of the most major project in the Caspian region. First of all, it is seen as a great opportunity for Azerbaijan and Georgia to acquire a direct access to the European market through Turkey; thus avoiding any dependence on the Russian side. Secondly, the pipeline was constructed for the transportation of big volumes of oil, which Azerbaijan cannot provide all alone. Therefore, to keep the operation of the pipeline economically viable, the crude exports from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan were also added to the BTC. However, in 2015 Kazakhstan stopped to fill the BTC with its crude because of the expansion of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). Taking into account the reductions in the Azeri oil, the overall used capacity of the BTC constituted less than 55% of the available volume in 2006. Nevertheless, it is too early to abandon the BTC viability, especially for Kazakhstan. Due to the expected rise in the national oil production caused by the revival of Kashagan oilfield, there is a probability that Kazakhstan would need additional transportation routes to export its crude, where the BTC can prove it to be highly useful.

So far, Kazakhstan's overall oil exports needs are fully satisfied via CPC. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium exports Kazakhstan's oil through the territory of Russia, bringing to the port of Novorossiysk, which is situated at the Black Sea. In 2016, the CPC managed 63% of the whole national exports, and the figures are expected to increase, as the Kashagan production will continue to expand. Currently, Kazakhstan is working on a number of key energy transit infrastructure projects, including phased expansion of the Caspian Pipelines Consortium oil pipeline, the creation of the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System and increase of the capacity of the Kazakhstan -China oil pipeline. CPC Expansion Project assumes upgrade of 5 existing and construction of 10 additional oil pumping stations (2 in the area of Kazakhstan and 8 in Russia) construction of 6 tanks (capacity 100.000 CBM each) in addition to 4 existing oil storage tanks near Novorossivsk and third portable mooring facility at CPC sea terminal, and replacement of 88-Km section of the pipeline in the territory of Kazakhstan with the pipe of bigger diameter. Total project investment will make 5,4 billion USD. The project's completion will be reached in the second half of 2017. After expansion, CPC will increase oil shipment to 67 million tonnes a year, of which 56 million tonnes from producers in Kazakhstan and 11 million tonnes from those in Russia. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System includes construction of a pipeline between Yeskene and Kuryk (739 km), in Kazakhstan, together with pumping station at the Tengiz field, and of another one to connect with Tengiz-Oporny-Uzen-Aktau main oil pipeline, plus an oil terminal and a new port in Kuryk village, plus rehabilitation and expansion of the port in Aktau city. The initial capacity of the new pipeline will amount to 23-25 million tons per year with the possibility of future expansion to 56 million tons. The system will ensure additional export capacity for volumes coming from Kashagan field.

What is important to note, is that the aforementioned projects have already been in the stage of implementation, apart from the mere envisioning. In contrast to that, the Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline has only been a prospective venture, which however has not been brought to life yet. The Trans-Caspian pipeline would be modelled to transport the natural gas from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and further on, to Europe. Despite the fact that Turkmenistan already has a share in the BTC, its national oil reserves do not prove to be as rich as those of its natural gas. Actually, Turkmenistan possesses some of the largest natural gas reserves in the world, with its Galkynysh gas field being the world's second largest gas field. Despite Turkmenistan's vast gas reserves, the country has been unable to deliver it to the European market so far. A solution for the problem could be a construction of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which would cross the Caspian seabed and transport the gas via Azerbaijan to Europe. The obstacle for the implementation of the project has been both high costs and complexity of the construction. As the potential pipeline would cross the Caspian seabed it would inevitably cross the water territories of other Caspian states. In this case, the absence of clear regulation of the Caspian Sea issue poses the main difficulty on the way to bring the dreams about the pipeline to life. Another issue, is Russian unwillingness to support the Trans-Caspian pipeline, which can bring Turkmenistan's gas to Europe, where GazProm enjoys a relative dominance on the market. This, however, is not critical, as the key problem still resides around the Caspian Convention.

Regarding the news on the development of work on Convention process, there are some positive tendencies in this direction. On the 5th December 2017 Moscow held a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries of the Caspian region. The main result of the meeting was the settlement of all key issues regarding the project of the Caspian Seal Legal Status Convention. It is expected that the responsible experts will carry out the technical part of the work of preparing the project of the Convention for its future signing at the upcoming summit of the Caspian Sea states in Kazakhstan in 2018. Currently, the preparation of protocols' project for the Agreement on Cooperation in Security on the Caspian Sea from 2010 is taking place, along with the preparation of other protocols' projects in spheres of environment protection, terrorism, organized crime, security of sea routes and so on. According to Kazakhstan's Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Kairat Abdrahmanov, the regulation of the Caspian Sea Legal Status question is one of the main priorities for Kazakhstan, which is highly interested in achieving the resolution of this issue. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov points out the all the relevant questions are resolved, and the content of the future Convention is largely ready. Overall, after the long and protracted discussions on the Caspian Sea Legal Status, the final Document is currently worked on by the experts in charge and is expected to be signed during the next Summit of the Caspian Sea states in Astana, July 2018.

Summing up, the question of defining the legal status of the Caspian Sea is one of the kea issues in the context of political stability and economic development of the Caspian Sea area. The protracted process of regulating the issue has been for a long time a reason for stumbled energy cooperation. Taking into account the fact, that all of the five Caspian littoral states possess rich energy endowments, it is clear how critical the issue is for the economies of the countries. Such projects as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System, and prospective Trans-Caspian gas pipeline are all heavily dependent on the political stability of the Caspian Sea. Therefore, the definition of the legal status of the sea, as well as successful delimitation of its seabed will allow using the benefits of transport and transit opportunities for Kazakhstan and other Caspian littoral states.

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KAZAKHSTANI DIPLOMACY AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

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Since the early days of its independence Kazakhstan has been active in multilateral diplomacy. Not only has the country acceded to numerous international organizations but has also been a founding member of several ones. The most noteworthy ones are the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – both are considered as principal diplomatic arenas in Asia. During the past decade Kazakhstan has chaired such significant entities as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). However, as of 2018 the nation's biggest diplomatic success has been the non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

For the past years Kazakhstanhas been a proactive UN member making a number of contributions to the organization's cause. Those include the inauguration of the International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures and designating the August 29th as the International Day Against Nuclear Tests as a means of bringing public attention to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test