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Студенттер мен жас ғалымдардың
«ҒЫЛЫМ ЖӘНЕ БІЛІМ - 2018»
XIII Халықаралық ғылыми конференциясы

СБОРНИК МАТЕРИАЛОВ

XIII Международная научная конференция
студентов и молодых ученых
«НАУКА И ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ - 2018»

The XIII International Scientific Conference
for Students and Young Scientists
«SCIENCE AND EDUCATION - 2018»



12th April 2018, Astana

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judicial researches is as advantageous as in criminology.

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MONGOLIAN-CHINESE ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS

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Mongolia and China have mutual interests in developing friendly relations and cooperation, and to make efforts in order to advance the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries in all sectors.

Mongolia and China will coordinate the Belt and Road initiative and Development Road strategy and start a joint study on the establishment of a border cooperation zone and Free Trade Agreement. The sides agreed to move forward bilateral cooperation in traditional sectors such as mining and infrastructure development and strengthen cooperation in ger area re-planning and agriculture, fully utilizing the cooperation platform of Mongolia-China Expo. China pledged to continue to assist Mongolia in transit transport and help gain access to the sea whereas Mongolia will ensure policy stability and create favorable investment climate for Chinese and foreign investors.

Mongolia and China have long-standing historic and traditional relations. China and Mongolia share a borderline of 4676 kilometers long. The two countries established diplomatic relations on Oct. 16, 1949. In 1951, China and Mongolia established trade relations. In 1960, they signed the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of China and Mongolia. In the late 1960s, bilateral relations suffered setbacks. In the 1970s, the two countries resumed the dispatch of ambassadors. In the 1980s, bilateral relations saw gradual improvement. In 1989, bilateral relations and the relations between the ruling Communist Party of China and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party were normalized.

In 1989, the two governments set up a committee on economic, trade, scientific and technological cooperation, and 7 meetings have been held. In 1991, a new trade agreement replacing intergovernmental credit trade with cash trade was signed. In the same year, they signed an investment protection agreement. By the statistics from China's General Administration of Customs, in 2002, Sino-Mongolian trade volume totaled US\$ 363 million, of which China's exports accounted for US\$ 140 million and its imports US\$ 223 million.[1]

On the basis of equality and mutual benefit, China and Mongolia have developed economic and trade cooperation. By statistics from the Mongolian side, up to the end of 2002, there were 825 enterprises with Chinese investment in Mongolia. With its investment exceeding US\$ 281 million, China has remained Mongolia's biggest investor, reaching some 40% of Mongolia's total foreign investment.[1]

Nowadays, China's growing global economic influence felt more keenly than in Mongolia. By far, China is Mongolia's largest export market. On November 2016, about 80 percent of Mongolia's total exports went to China. By a smaller margin, China is also Mongolia's largest import market, making up about 30 percent of total imports by early November 2016. The second largest import market was Russia. According to statistics about 87.8 percent of Mongolia's total exports went to China in 2017. Also 41.8 percent total imports went to China in 2017. According to the most recent statistics released by the Bank of Mongolia (BoM), total trade turnover by early November 2016 fell slightly, by 4.9 percent, compared to the same period the previous year. Exports rose slightly, by 0.8 percent, while imports fell by 11.9 percent. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) forecasts that GDP growth in 2017 will be slightly higher, at 1.4 percent, by no means anywhere near its peak in 2011, but much stronger than the predicted 0.3 percent it experienced in 2016. [1]

At the peak of its growth, the government decided to issue what was called "Chinggis Bonds" in 2012, raising US\$1.5 billion to spend on infrastructure, salaries and subsidized mortgages. However, due to the commodities glut, decrease in FDI and slowdown in demand from China, Mongolia now faces about US\$2 billion in public and private debt payments, due as early as March 2017. The budget deficit rose to 20 percent of GDP in 2016, and total external debt is estimated to be US\$23.5 billion, US\$8.4 billion of which is government debt. To resolve the issue, the government submitted a request for a rescue loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in September 2016. [2]. It will still need additional support, however, and for this, the country has turned to its southern neighbor.

The IMF loan request is seen as an attempt by the country to allay its dependence on China, of which Mongolia is wary. Nevertheless, China is still a major player in the Mongolian economy, and the two governments were prepared to negotiate a potential US\$4.2 billion loan agreement.[2]

Due to a visit by the Dalai Lama to Mongolia for a convention on Buddhist science, however, the talks were delayed. Afterwards, China released a strongly worded rebuke to Mongolia. In addition, transport surcharges on copper and fees on coal increased at several Chinese border towns through which Mongolian exports pass. Rio Tinto suspended shipments from Oyu Tolgoi over "safety and security concerns". After the government assured China that a visit from the Dalai Lama would not occur again, relations stabilized somewhat. However, it is expected that Mongolia will receive a worse loan deal than before the visit.

With Oyu Tolgoi up and running, and loan talks underway, optimism has returned to Mongolia, at least from the long term perspective. The country still holds immense amounts of

natural resources, and this will attract investors and buyers.

The short term still holds pitfalls that require careful navigation by the government. Mongolia will have to overcome numerous obstacles as it struggles to deal with debt, growing inflation, and stagnated growth. Of particular concern to the Mongolian government is the extent to which the economy will remain dependent on China. In many ways, Mongolia has always attempted to decrease this influence, mostly famously by espousing a “third neighbor” policy and looking to the U.S. for support. However, it is clear that in order to grow sustainably, Mongolia will need Chinese support, and China, for the most part, is happy to supply it.

Prospects of Mongolian and Chinese relation in context of One Belt One Road are obvious. The China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor, under China’s beloved One Belt One Road initiative, will be critical in order to improve trade and logistics between the two countries.

The corridor is expected to increase customs clearance services and e-commerce between the three countries, and bring much anticipated trade activity to Mongolia; although, like many things about Sino-Mongolian relations, this has not yet been the case.

Mongolia is most important part of Chinese OBOR strategy in a number of ways. Most fundamentally, country forms part of China- Mongolia Russia Economic Corridor, one of six such corridors identified in OBOR documents. In 2014, the bilateral relationship between Mongolia and China was elevated comprehensive strategic partnership. Cooperation in other areas has increased among two states. The two states have implemented a currency swap and preferential loans have been provided to Mongolia by the Chinese via the Silk Road Fund and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the latter of which Mongolia is a founding member. Following a transit agreement in 2015, border trade zones were created and Mongolia was given access to port of Tianjin, a priority for the Mongolian government. In the same year, controversial land lease was signed. Infrastructure projects focusing on investments in road, rail, energy, and border facilities have been announced and implemented, though construction activity has concentrated on the Chinese side of the border.

Finally, China has made an effort to strengthen people to people ties by establishing Confucius Institutes, building a children’s hospital in UB and promoting students exchange. Sino Mongolian exchange have intensified a number of concerns have been raised. In addition, reports of China dominating foreign policy investment in Mongolia paralleled by a sharp decline in investments from other sources. Overall FDI in Mongolia plummeted from 4.5 billion USD in 2011 to less than 100 million USD in 2015, according to the World Bank. [4]. Tensions among the government and Rio Tinto, a British- Australian mining giant, go some way towards accounting for this drop, as they have prevented a multi- billion dollar expansion of the Oyu Tolgoi copper mine. The rise and fall of the Egiin Gol Hydropower Project is similarly complex. In fact, the feasibility study for Eg River dam was carried out not by the Chinese, but by the Asian Development Bank. Politically, China is likely to leverage its influence to draw red lines on certain issues in Mongolia, as it does elsewhere.

Preventing visits of the Dalai Lama is the most common objective of these efforts. Fears of China infringing on Mongolian sovereignty, however, may be overblown. The Mongolian government will continue to play a key role in navigating the country’s relationship with China. Its ability to do so may be greater than it appears at first glance. For one, China needs to consider local interests as it seeks to expand its influence abroad, especially in democracies like Mongolia where public opinion is important. This was one of the example of the 2016 Mongolian parliamentary election, which saw a drastic shift in power from the Democratic Party, which was made responsible for the country’s dire economic situation, to the Mongolian People’s Party, with the latter picking up 65 of the 76 seats in the national legislature.

The initial impact of the election on Sino- Mongolian relations appears limited and the landslide victory had much to do with Mongolia’s new majoritarian electoral system. Still, the result clearly demonstrated the ability of Mongolian voters to their government accountable. Mongolian government can also take an active role in shaping the nature of Chinese investments. As China becomes a global leader in renewable energy, for instance, Mongolia may be able to secure Chinese

help in developing more sustainable, energy sources. This will require aligning its domestic policies accordingly. To counterbalance the overreliance of its mining sector on Chinese demand for natural resources, Mongolia can take steps to diversify its economy by promoting eco-tourism, higher-value agricultural exports and other sectors. The government can block or renegotiate investments which are deemed to run counter to Mongolian interests, as it did the Oyu Tolgoi mine expansion.

China also has an interests in ensuring that it makes good on its promise to make OBOR beneficial to participating countries. The Chinese government and its citizens will have to take on a shared responsibility for the projects realized by Chinese companies or with Chinese funding abroad. Beyond the government level, civil society can also play a role in monitoring Chinese investments. In Mongolia, initial framework for doing so exists from years of contending with foreign mining companies.

The NGO OT Watch, which monitors the development of the Oyu Tolgoi mine, is one prominent Mongolian civil society actor. On the Chinese side, signs are emerging that the much talked about phenomenon of NGO internationalization is creating the space needed for Chinese NGOs like Beijing's Global Environmental Institute to act as watch-dogs of China's investments abroad. China's growing influence should not distract from the other actors who continue to influence Mongolian affairs. In 2010, Mongolia sought to secure foreign investment to develop the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine. An initial bid by companies from a variety of countries, including China's Xinhua Mining, was blocked by Japan and South Korea after their companies had been excluded. Ultimately, Mongolia finds itself in the position of needing to manage the influence of various actors, among which China is the most powerful.

Finally, OBOR has led to an intensification of Sino- Mongolian ties, which has been accompanied by growing economic, political and environmental concerns. At the same time, isolating the effect of OBOR on individual developments is not straightforward. Different actors both in government and civil society will be called upon to ensure that a balance is struck between enabling Mongolia to reap the potential benefits of closer ties to China while taking stakeholder concerns into account.

In conclusion, Mongolia and China have longstanding history, and positive neighborhood relations. Their relations keep developing year by year. Also OBOR project is the biggest opportunity for Mongolia. It supports Mongolian development and economy. Their further, relations will be tightened for the sake of both countries.

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